Sunday, June 29, 2008

Agustin vs. Edu

Agustin vs. Edu [88 SCRA 195, 1979]

Facts:

Respondent, Land Transportation Commissioner Edu, in pursuant to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization, issued a letter of instruction requiring every motor vehicle, with the exception of motorcycles, to be equipped with a pair of specified Early Warning Device [EWD] consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors before they can have their vehicles registered.
Petitioner, Agustin, is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car that is already properly equipped with functional hazard lights blinking in front and rear of the vehicle which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of emergencies to help prevent road accidents. Petitioner then questions the said letter of instruction and contends that it is unconstitutional since such is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public and would unjustly enrich EWD manufacturers to the expense of the motorists which could have better and inexpensive substitutes.
A temporary restraining order was then issued by the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Is petitioner correct in questioning the constitutionality of the letter of instruction issued in pursuant of an international law?

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Since such hazards and road accidents caused by the lacked of early warning devices have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization, and since the Philippines has ratified to such treaty and adopts generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, the principle of pacta sunt servanda now sets in. the principle requires States who are signatories to such treaty to have a compliance to it in good faith.

Petition dismissed.

J.BL Reyes vs. Bagatsing

JBL Reyes vs. Bagatsing [G.R. No. 65366, 1983]

Facts:

Petitioner, JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Biases Coalition, sought a permit to hold a peaceful march and rally for 3 hours from the City of Manila. The route of the march would cover from Luneta Park to the gates of the United States Embassy where they would hold a short program. Respondent, Bagatsing, as the City Mayor denied the petition for reasons due to police intelligence reports that some would enter the rally with subversive or criminal intentions and would disrupt the assembly where a large number of people are expected to attend. Petitioner was given the chance to be issued a permit if only they would hold their rally at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured.
Hence, this petition for mandamus with writ of preliminary injunction to review the decision of the Manila mayor denying the permit.

Issue:

Did the mayor really have justifiable reasons/grounds in denying the permit for petitioner to hold a rally?

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative on the ground that there was no showing of a clear and present danger of substantive evil that could justify the denial of the permit. As a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961, the Philippines, as the receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The Vienna Convention should be pat of the law of the land since it is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. Respondent would only be justified in denying petitioner’s application if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.

The mandatory injunction prayed for is granted.

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons [90 Phil. 70, 1951]

Facts:

Petitioner Mejoff is a Russian and a secret operative of the Japanese forces brought into the country during the former’s occupation here. He was later on arrested as a Japanese spy by the American forces and was handed to the Commonwealth Government for disposition. He was then issued an order of release by the People’s Court. However, he was proven by the deportation board to have entered the country illegally sometime in 1944. He was then arrested and again taken into custody and was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail while waiting to be deported out of the country. More than 2 years have elapsed still the Government has not found way and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although it should be said in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner even his native country. Hence, an action for the petition of the issuance of writ of habeas corpus was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Will the action prosper?

Held:

It was held by the Supreme Court that the prolonged detention of the petitioner is unwarranted by international law and the Philippine Constitution. The Philippines, by its Constitution, expressly adopts generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation. The Philippines, being a member of the United Nations, was subject to the latter’s resolution on the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" wherein it provides equality of all human beings in degree and rights regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, or any other opinion and that everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law. It further provides that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. The writ was then issued under the terms that the petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him and that he shall also put up a bond of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion

Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion [G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000]


Facts:

Respondent, Mark Jimenez, was under extradition proceedings for having committed several offenses against the united states government under the RP-US extradition treaty and Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country" which was founded upon the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution. Respondent then claims his procedural right to due notice and hearing of his case which is indispensable of the right to due process.


Issue:

Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?


Held:

The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent. Categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.


These two components law of the land, international law and municipal or national law, are not pitted against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by PD No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right.


The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.


Petition dismissed for lack of merit.


Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni [83 Phil. 171]


Facts:

Petitioner is facing charges in violation of two Conventions namely the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention. He contends that the Military Commission had no jurisdiction over him and jurisdiction over his case alleging that the Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention and only became a signatory to the Geneva Convention by year 1947.


Issue:

Is petitioner correct?


Held:

The Supreme Court held otherwise. The rules of both Conventions, the Hague and the Geneva, are said to have formed part of the generally accepted principles of international law. The said rules are based on such principles that they now form part of the law of our nation even if we [The Philippines] is not a signatory to the Conventions embodying them. In fact, our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.