Tuesday, July 22, 2008

THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION

Convention signed at Montevideo December 26, 1933; Senate advice and consent to ratification, with a reservation, June 15, 1934; Ratified by the President of the United States, with a reservation, June 29, 1934; Ratification of the United States deposited with the Pan American Union July 13, 1934; Entered into force December 26, 1934; Proclaimed by the President of the United States January 18, 1935; Article 8 reaffirmed by protocol of December 23, 1936.

49 Stat. 3097;
Treaty Series 881

CONVENTION ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES


The Governments represented in the Seventh International Conference of American States:

Wishing to conclude a Convention on Rights and Duties of States, have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries:

Honduras:
MIGUEL PAZ BARAONA
AUGUSTO C. COELLO
LUIS BOGRAN

United States of America:
CORDELL HULL
ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL
J. REUBEN CLARK
J. BUTLER WRIGHT
SPRUILLE BRADEN
Miss SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE

El Salvador:
HECTOR DAVID CASTRO
ARTURO RAMON AVILA
J. CIPRIANO CASTRO

Dominican Republic:
TULIO M. CESTERO

Haiti:
JUSTIN BARAU
FRANCIS SALGADO
ANTOINE PIERRE-PAUL
EDMOND MANGONES

Argentina:
CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS
JUAN F. CAFFERATA
RAMON S. CASTILLO
CARLOS BREBBIA
ISIDORO RUIZ MORENO
LUIS A. PODESTA COSTA
RAUL PREBISCH
DANIEL ANTOKOLETZ

Venezuela:
CESAR ZUMETA
LUIS CHURTON
JOSE RAFAEL MONTTLLA

Uruguay:
ALBERTO MANE
JUAN JOSE AMEZAGA
JOSE G. ANTUNA
JUAN CARLOS BLANCO
Senora SOFIA A. V. DE DEMICHELI
MARTIN R. ECHEGOYEN
LUIS ALBERTO DE HERRERA
PEDRO MANINI RIOS
MATEO MARQUES CASTRO
RODOLFO MEZZERA
OCTAVIO MORAT6
LUIS MORQUIO
TEOFILO PINEYRO CHAIN
DARDO REGULES
JOSE SERRATO
JOSE PEDRO VARELA

Paraguay:
JUSTO PASTOR BENITEZ
GERONIMO RIART
HORACIO A. FERNANDEZ
Senorita MARIA F. GONZALEZ

Mexico:
JOSE MANUEL PUIG CASAURANC
ALFONSO REYES
BASILIO VADILLO
GENARO V. VASQUEZ
ROMEO ORTEGA
MANUEL J. SIERRA
EDUARDO SUAREZ

Panama:
J. D. AROSEMENA
EDUARDO E. HOLGUIN
OSCAR R. MULLER
MAGIN PONS

Bolivia:
CASTO ROJAS
DAVID ALVESTEGUI
ARTURO PINTO ESCALIER

Guatemala:
ALFREDO SKINNER KLEE
JOSE GONZALEZ CAMPO
CARLOS SALAZAR
MANUEL ARROYO

Brazil:
AFRANIO DE MELLO FRANCO
LUCILLO A DA CUNHA BUENO
FRANCISCO LUIS DA SILVA CAMPOS
GILBERTO AMADO
CARLOS CHAGAS
SAMUEL RIBEIRO

Ecuador:
AUGUSTO AGUIRRE APARICIO
HUMBERTO ALBORNOZ
ANTONIO PARRA
CARLOS PUIG VILASSAR
ARTURO SCARONE

Nicaragua:
LEONARDO ARGUELLO
MANUEL CORDERO REYES
CARLOS CUADRA PASOS

Colombia:
ALFONSO LOPEZ
RAIMUNDO RIVAS
JOSE CAMACEO CARRENO

Chile:
MIGUEL CRUCHAGA TOCORNAL
OCTAVIO SENORET SILVA
GUSTAVO RIVERA
JOSE RAMON GUTIERREZ
FELIX NIETO DEL RIO
FRANCISCO FIGUEROA SANCHEZ
BENJAMIN COHEN

Peru:
ALFREDO SOLE Y MURO
FELIPE BARREDA LAOS
LUIS FERNAN CISNEROS

Cuba:
ANGEL ALBERTO GIRAUDY
HERMINIO PORTELL VILA
ALFREDO NOGUEIRA

Who, after having exhibited their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and due order, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE 1

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population; b ) a defined territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.

ARTICLE 2

The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.

ARTICLE 3

The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts.

The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law.

ARTICLE 4

States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person under international law.

ARTICLE 5

The fundamental rights of states are not susceptible of being affected in any manner whatsoever.

ARTICLE 6

The recognition of a state merely signifies that the state which recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. Recognition is unconditional and irrevocable.

ARTICLE 7

The recognition of a state may be express or tacit. The latter results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new state.

ARTICLE 8

No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.

ARTICLE 9

The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all the inhabitants.

Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than those of the nationals.

ARTICLE 10

The primary interest of states is the conservation of peace. Differences of any nature which arise between them should be settled by recognized pacific methods.

ARTICLE 11

The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily.

ARTICLE 12

The present Convention shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the High Contracting Parties by virtue of international agreements.

ARTICLE 13

The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uruguay shall transmit authentic certified copies to the governments for the aforementioned purpose of ratification. The instrument of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union in Washington, which shall notify the signatory governments of said deposit. Such notification shall be considered as an exchange of ratifications.

ARTICLE 14

The present Convention will enter into force between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they deposit their respective ratifications.

ARTICLE 15

The present Convention shall remain in force indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice given to the Pan American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory governments. After the expiration of this period the Convention shall cease in its effects as regards the party which denounces but shall remain in effect for the remaining High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 16

The present Convention shall be open for the adherence and accession of the States which are not signatories. The corresponding instruments shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan American Union which shall communicate them to the other High Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof, the following Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French and hereunto affix their respective seals in the city of Montevideo, Republic of Uruguay, this 26th day of December, 1933.

RESERVATIONS

The Delegation of the United States of America, in signing the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, does so with the express reservation presented to the Plenary Session of the Conference on December 22, 1933, which reservation reads as follows:

The Delegation of the United States, in voting "yes" on the final vote on this committee recommendation and proposal, makes the same reservation to the eleven articles of the project or proposal that the United States Delegation made to the first ten articles during the final vote in the full Commission, which reservation is in words as follows:

"The policy and attitude of the United States Government toward every important phase of international relationships in this hemisphere could scarcely be made more clear and definite than they have been made by both word and action especially since March 4. I [Secretary of State Cordell Hull, chairman of U.S. delegation] have no disposition therefore to indulge in any repetition or rehearsal of these acts and utterances and shall not do so. Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the Roosevelt Administration the United States Government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations.

"In addition to numerous acts and utterances in connection with the carrying out of these doctrines and policies, President Roosevelt, during recent weeks, gave out a public statement expressing his disposition to open negotiations with the Cuban Government for the purpose of dealing with the treaty which has existed since 1903. I feel safe in undertaking to say that under our support of the general principle of non-intervention as has been suggested, no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt Administration. I think it unfortunate that during the brief period of this Conference there is apparently not time within which to prepare interpretations and definitions of these fundamental terms that are embraced in the report. Such definitions and interpretations would enable every government to proceed in a uniform way without any difference of opinion or of interpretations. I hope that at the earliest possible date such very important work will be done. In the meantime in case of differences of interpretations and also until they (the proposed doctrines and principles) can be worked out and codified for the common use of every government, I desire to say that the United States Government in all of its international associations and relationships and conduct will follow scrupulously the doctrines and policies which it has pursued since March 4 which are embodied in the different addresses of President Roosevelt since that time and in the recent peace address of myself on the 15th day of December before this Conference and in the law of nations as generally recognized and accepted".

The delegates of Brazil and Peru recorded the following private vote with regard to article 11: "That they accept the doctrine in principle but that they do not consider it codifiable because there are some countries which have not yet signed the Anti-War Pact of Rio de Janeiro 4 of which this doctrine is a part and therefore it does not yet constitute positive international law suitable for codification".

Source: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam03.htm

THE ZIMBABWE SITUATION

In a scene filled with tension and despair, men and women sit crouched, huddling on a 17 hour-long night train ride that will send them back to Zimbabwe. "Heads down," shouts a South African guard - because crouched down like this, the deportees are less likely to jump out the window. Despite this, more than a dozen Zimbabweans jump from the train that night; they'd rather risk death than face the ruling party back home.

These men and women have been living illegally in South Africa. But the South Africans don't want them; they round up thousands of Zimbabweans each week, gather them into overcrowded detention centers, then finally, send them back across the border to Zimbabwe.

On this night, FRONTLINE/World reporter Alexis Bloom takes the journey with them. Talking to people on the train, Bloom senses that it will be the last chance for many to talk openly. One man tells her: "You can't get the truth in Zimbabwe... Even if you come to me in Zimbabwe, I can't give you the truth because there are people always watching. And once you go, they will kill me."

When Bloom and producer Cassandra Herrman traveled to Zimbabwe to report "Shadows and Lies," they entered carrying fake business cards, pretending to be tourists. It is impossible for foreign journalists to work freely in Zimbabwe these days. They arrive at the spectacular Victoria Falls, once the high point on Zimbabwe's popular tourist circuit and one of the seven natural wonders of the world. Now the hotels at the falls are eerily empty.

Ten years ago, explains Bloom, as she counts out bricks of the local currency in the hotel, Zimbabwe was one of the richest countries in Africa, but with inflation now running at more than 1,000 percent, Zimbabwean money isn't worth the ink that's used to print it. Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's long-standing president, was once a respected liberator, but after 26 years in power, he has turned this jewel of Africa into an impoverished state of fear.

From Victoria Falls, Bloom and Herrman set off for the capital, Harare. Along the way, they film through the car window, shooting long lines of cars at empty gas stations. People can wait for weeks before fuel arrives, Bloom is told. They film people scavenging in garbage dumps alongside baboons, and they pass families on the roadside who have resorted to donkey carts to get around. Signs of food and fuel shortages are everywhere.

In Harare, they meet with journalist Duminsani Muleya, who takes them to the building that used to house The Daily News, Zimbabwe's last independent daily newspaper. The newspaper's offices were bombed, under suspicious circumstances, after clashes with the government.

Muleya tells Bloom what is happening to his country, but only behind the safety of the tinted windows of Bloom's car. "Zimbabwe has, without a doubt, the weakest currency in Africa, if not even in the world," he tells Bloom. "It has now become a monumental museum of failure. The air is fraught with frustration, with anger, with despair, and some people have just given up."

It wasn't always this bleak, says Bloom. "Robert Mugabe was once a liberation hero, admired around the world. He ushered in prosperity, health care and a literacy rate of 85 percent - the highest in Africa."

But politics here has turned into thuggery, she says - holding on to power has become Mugabe's top priority. And during the last seven years, intimidation has become his chief weapon. His radical land redistribution plan set out to seize white-owned farms and turn them over to black farmworkers. Instead, Bloom reports, these farms were given to members of Mugabe's inner circle, who didn't know how to run them. A once-thriving agricultural economy has been brought to its knees, and many of Zimbabwe's most productive farms now lie fallow.

Describing Mugabe's regime today, a former ally of his, Margaret Dongo, tells Bloom: "They have no feeling for any other person, for any human beings anymore. What they want to make sure of is how can they maintain their power base." Dongo is a famous freedom fighter. She fought for Zimbabwe's independence in the 1970s and became the first member of parliament to confront her old ruling party colleagues.

"You're watching the country going down the drain," Dongo continues. "You look at the time it took to build it up, and then one can just destroy it overnight. It is something painful."

In the city of Bulawayo - long considered an opposition stronghold - things look even worse: There are long lines all over town, people waiting to buy the most basic necessities, but many supermarket shelves are simply empty. A local farmer tells Bloom that the army has launched a new policy of farm seizures that targets small family farms owned by ordinary Zimbabweans - this despite the evident lack of food. In an effort to make up the shortfall precipitated by Mugabe's disastrous land reform, the army is now ordering locals to dig up the crops that feed their families and instead grow maize that will be sent to the government mill. A woman tells Bloom that when she protested these orders, a soldier beat her.

Resistance runs deep in Bulawayo - and there is none so outspoken as Pius Ncube, Bulawayo's Catholic archbishop. Despite constant surveillance and death threats, Ncube refuses to be intimidated by Mugabe: He denounces the government and tries as best he can to look after parishioners who are increasingly short of food. "Women come and cry before me, 'We haven't eaten for all these days,'" he tells our reporter. "What I pray for is that people become so restless and angry enough ... to simply say, 'We've had enough' and get the army to their side, the police ... and rise up and bring him down."

Over the course of his rule, many say that Mugabe has brought each one of the country's democratic institutions to heel: Critics say he has muzzled the media, politicized the police force and rewritten the laws to maintain his power base. To explore the reality of justice under Mugabe, Bloom and Herrman meet with two members of the opposition movement - the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Khethani Sibanda and Sazini Mpofu describe how they became the fall guys for a much larger campaign to discredit the opposition, and they speak of the violence that the regime is willing to use in its name.

The reality of daily life in Zimbabwe comes into stark relief when one drives past the luxurious gated compounds in Harare. Among them is Mugabe's sprawling retirement palace, epitomizing the splendor of the ruling elite. But for most Zimbabweans, life is increasingly grim: tin-roof shacks, even cardboard boxes, are the homes for many of Mugabe's people.

The fate of the urban poor comes to light in footage smuggled out of Zimbabwe in 2005 that shows police burning and bulldozing many of these dwellings as part of a government campaign called Operation Murambatsvina, or "Clear Out the Filth." Though Mugabe claimed this government operation would beautify urban areas across Zimbabwe, many say his real aim was to break up these communities because they had become a breeding ground for revolt. The clearing operation left some 700,000 people homeless, and millions lost their livelihood overnight. And though Mugabe promised to build better homes for these communities, a year later Bloom is witness that nothing has been done.

Leaving a muted and beaten country behind, Bloom and Herrman travel back to South Africa. It's nighttime in downtown Johannesburg, and the police are trying to control a crowd of anxious Zimbabweans, lined up and waiting to apply for political asylum at an immigration office. The authorities here are overwhelmed. More than 2 million people have poured into South Africa from Zimbabwe since the country's economic collapse.

"For these Zimbabweans, a place in line represents survival," says Bloom. "They know only a handful will ever be allowed to stay."

But it's not only refugees and economic migrants who make their way to South Africa. Prominent Zimbabweans also find it increasingly difficult to continue to live in Zimbabwe. Visiting the offices of Zimbabwean newspaper publisher Trevor Ncube, Bloom asks him why the rest of world remains silent while Zimbabwe continues to break down.

"South Africans don't know what to do with Robert Mugabe," he tells her. "The Americans don't have a clue... How do you deal with a fallen hero like Mugabe, a man that the whole continent looked up to, who assisted the liberation of South Africa? How do you tell your father to sit down and shut up?"

The final words come from an asylum seeker, who is being loaded into a security van, to be deported back to Zimbabwe. "This is torture," he cries. "This is torture."

Source: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/zimbabwe504/video_index.html

SUDAN CONFLICT [The Darfur Report]

Introduction

As the conflict in Darfur enters its sixth year, conditions continue to deteriorate for civilians. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed, even by the most conservative estimates. The United Nations puts the death toll at roughly 300,000, while the former U.N. undersecretary-general puts the number at no less than 400,000. Up to 2.5 million Darfuris have fled their homes and continue to live in camps throughout Darfur, or in refugee camps in neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic. Based on Sudan’s behavior over the past five years, it is clear that unless the international community imposes additional political costs for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s intransigence, his government will continue to buy time by accepting initiatives only to backtrack later or impose new conditions that render the Humanitarian assistance in Darfur continues to be at risk of collapse, in part because of sustained harassment by the Sudanese government, and in part because of the government’s militia allies and common criminals. In September 2006, the United Nations estimated that such a collapse would cause up to 100,000 civilian deaths every month. Troublesome developments suggest that such a failure is becoming more likely: the World Food Program’s Humanitarian Air Service received no funding in the first three months of 2008. Last-minute donations totaling six million dollars funded it through the beginning of May. In the second half of 2007, the Sudanese government’s divide-and-conquer strategy, described by Human Rights Watch as “chaos by design,” caused an increasingly frenzied free-for-all in Darfur. Rebel groups fragmented further and criminal activity as well as intertribal fighting increased exponentially. Still, the effects of tribal fighting should not be overemphasized. Of the eight largest displacements between January and November 2007, seven resulted from government or Janjaweed attacks. Only one was the result of intertribal fighting. In early 2008, deaths and displacements from military operations by the government, its allied militias and rebels were even more common relative to those caused by tribal conflicts.

Worsening Humanitarian Crisis

The number of people driven from their homes as a result of Khartoum’s military campaign in Darfur is growing at an alarming pace. In the first nine months of 2007, more than 250,000 civilians abandoned their homes for camps that were already filled beyond capacity. By year’s end, there were 280,000 newly displaced people. Of those, nearly 175,000 were in South Darfur, although there was a sharp spike in violence and displacement in West Darfur in the beginning of 2008. There is no room for new arrivals in most camps. All camps in or near Nyala and al-Fasher, the capitals of South and North Darfur, respectively, were full by the end of June 2007. Al-Salam camp in South Darfur, has an official capacity of 14,000. Al-Salam housed 3,500 in January 2007, 13,300 in March 2007 and over 33,000 in early July 2007. By the end of June, there were over 51,000 inhabitants in al-Salam, and hundreds more who settled on its outskirts because they were refused admittance. Those individuals were since relocated to other crowded camps. Gunmen entering the camps to loot and harass civilians and aid workers make the problem worse. It is no surprise then that all indicators point to a sicker, hungrier population. Child malnutrition rates, considered to be among the best humanitarian barometers, for Darfuri children under five reached 16.1 percent in 2007, compared to 12.9 percent in 2006. The rate surpassed the 15 percent emergency threshold for the first time since 2004, according to a December 2007 United Nations study. For children six to 29 months old, the malnutrition rate was an alarming 21.3 percent. Malnutrition rates could be even higher, considering that publication of more than six nutrition surveys from the last nine months are held up by Khartoum. In North Darfur, where malnutrition is highest, the governor decided that malnutrition surveys can only take place between May and June or October and November, regardless of conditions on the ground. The governor also scrutinizes results before release.

A spike in humanitarian vehicle hijacks is forcing many organizations to deliver food by airplane. Because air deliveries cost much more than land deliveries, they have usually been reserved for the most inaccessible areas. Air delivery is rapidly depleting organizations’ financial resources. The rainy season starting in June will cause food deliveries to drop off considerably. It is essential that food be stockpiled before then, when demand could increase by 50 percent. The sharp and sudden rise in global food prices, which already resulted in riots in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, is also restricting rainy season stockpiles. The price of cereals in one location increased by 500 percent. Instability and rising prices account for a 50 percent cut in daily World Food Program deliveries, from 1,800 metric tons to 900 metric tons. As of May, cereal rations shrank by half to 225 grams a day per person, pulses by half to 30 grams and sugar by half to 15 grams. Kilocalories have gone down by 40 percent, to 1,242 per day from the recommended rate of 2,156 per day. Sexual violence as a tool of war for Sudanese government forces and allied militias is extensively documented by independent human rights organizations and the U.N. As Human Rights Watch reported in April, “it is almost impossible to accurately quantify the prevalence of sexual violence in Darfur… given the secrecy surrounding the issue.” But there is ample evidence to show that sexual violence is practiced increasingly by rebels and common criminals. Women who were once targeted when they left the camps to collect firewood or other essentials now find themselves unsafe inside the camps as well.

Humanitarian groups under increased pressure

Over thirteen thousand humanitarian relief workers provide aid to roughly 4.2 million Darfuris, about two-thirds of the area’s total population. Attacks against humanitarian workers increased 150 percent from June 2006 to June 2007. From January to November 2007 alone:

• 128 vehicles owned or leased by humanitarian organizations were hijacked;
• 74 humanitarian convoys were attacked, ambushed or looted;
• 18 humanitarian personnel were injured;
• 58 humanitarian personnel were arrested or detained;
• 131 humanitarian personnel were kidnapped;
• 59 humanitarian personnel were physically or sexually assaulted;
• 12 humanitarian personnel were killed.

The frequency of attacks against humanitarian targets increased during the first quarter of 2008. In the first four months of the year, 113 humanitarian vehicles were hijacked. In January, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that attacks on aid workers were a “debilitating factor for humanitarian operations.” Nearly 90 aid workers were abducted in Darfur since the beginning of the year, according to the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan. Forty-six humanitarian premises were also attacked, resulting in eight deaths and eight injuries. Aid workers and U.N. personnel are increasingly traveling by air, further limiting already patchy access. Making matters worse, aid groups in Darfur can not speak freely about the humanitarian situation. According to a Reuters/AlertNet poll released in May 2007, four-fifths of individual workers and two-thirds of relief agencies were not free to talk about killings, rapes and abductions in Darfur. Some groups even refused to participate in the poll. “Speaking about touchy issues might result in restrictions and an order to leave the country which we do not want to risk, considering many people depend upon our support,” said an aid agency spokesperson on condition of anonymity. Aid workers that speak publicly are inevitably expelled from the country, as was the case in late August 2007 with the country director for CARE, one of the most active humanitarian groups in Darfur.

Political Developments


Justice and Equality Movement attacks the capital


On the morning of May 10, roughly 3,000 Justice and Equality Movement rebels appeared on the outskirts of Omdurman, Khartoum’s twin city across the Nile. The Zaghawa-dominated rebel group travelled at night, largely unnoticed, from their stronghold in Darfur some 600 miles away. Heavy fighting was reported in and around the capital for days. Government forces halted the advancing rebels, but up to 1,000 rebels shed their military gear and dispersed among the civilians. The government responded by arresting hundreds of rebel sympathizers, but also ordinary Zaghawa around Khartoum and Omdurman. There are consistent reports of government torture of civilians. At least two extra-judicial killings in public by government forces and allied popular defense forces are confirmed, and dozens more remain unconfirmed. There are unconfirmed reports that a number of security services surrounded and sealed off the Souq Libya neighborhood of Omdurman, where large numbers of Darfuris live and work.

After the JEM attack, significant government troop movement was reported throughout Darfur. Troop movement is reported especially in North Darfur, where JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim is said to be hiding. Government forces attacked the Sudan Liberation Army/al-Nur faction stronghold of Jabal Eissa in North Darfur, despite indications that SLA commanders declined to join the JEM attack. JEM likely executed this campaign without assistance from any other rebel factions, possibly as a result of rebel divisions.

Significance of fragmentation among rebels

Rebel fragmentation significantly contributes to growing insecurity in Darfur. It is increasingly difficult to determine who is in command of a specific group of combatants at any given time. Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at the U.N. summed up the situation:

The fighting in Darfur makes clear that preparing for political negotiations does not seem to be a priority for either the Government or rebel movements. The implications are dire. On the one hand, negotiations are required to bring this crisis to an end. But with the Government intent on military action and the rebels either fighting or fragmenting, it is difficult to see an opening for political negotiations. On the other hand, a peacekeeping operation alone cannot bring security to Darfur.

Further complicating matters, the Sudanese air force bombed locations where rebel leaders were due to unify their negotiating positions. Only a fraction of the rebel factions (between ten and 17, depending on the source) attended peace talks in Libya in October 2007. The absence of pivotal actors, insufficient preparation by mediators and minimal flexibility from Khartoum hurt the talks. The only consensus was that “more talks were necessary.” Since then, in large part due to facilitation by the rebel-group-cum-political-party Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, a number of factions agreed to present unified negotiating positions at any future talks.

Resettlement

Tens of thousands of non-Darfuris have arrived in Darfur since the beginning of 2007, many to settle on land belonging to displaced Darfuris. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Sudanese government’s Commissioner for Refugees reported that as many as 30,000 people have left Chad for Darfur in a steady flow since early 2007. They reported that most, though not all, are from nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes which self-identify as Arab. After assessment teams, commissioned by the two agencies, interviewed new arrivals who claimed they were fleeing violence and insecurity in Chad, UNHCR

recommended that most new arrivals receive refugee status. There have also been repeated allegations that 45,000 settlers from Niger crossed into Darfur. Some of the new arrivals report being instructed to settle on Darfuri land. The UNHCR/COR report on the 30,000 Chadian settlers specifically notes that “upon their arrival in Western Darfur, some families reported having been directed by local Sudanese tribesman or local Sudanese leaders to occupy empty land, especially in the Wadi Azoum and Wadi Saleh areas. The land, for the most part, belongs to people who are now displaced in camps throughout Darfur or eastern Chad.” Tribal and ethnic tensions in Darfur increased because Darfuris suspect that new arrivals plan to reside in Darfur permanently. Many Darfuris also believe that the Sudanese government is facilitating the resettlement. Rumors circulated that Chadian refugees were offered Sudanese identification cards. A U.N. official claimed that one hospital was asked to forge 100 birth certificates. Many Darfuris fear that the Sudanese government plans to permanently alter the ethnic composition of Darfur and in turn guarantee tens of thousands of additional votes for the ruling National Congress Party in the Sudanese national elections in 2009.

National census

In April, the Sudanese government began a national census. The census is an integral part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended a two-decade long war between north and south Sudan. The census should have been completed last year, but was postponed multiple times due to logistic difficulties — not only in Darfur but also in the south, east and extreme north of the country — and government delays. Nearly two million southerners who fled their homes during the civil war remain displaced in the north and will not be counted in their home districts. Millions of Darfuris are in the same situation. Mass displacements in Sudan will hurt the effort to establish an accurate count of Sudan’s ethnic and religious composition to facilitate upcoming elections. Additionally, census forms do not establish religious or tribal affiliation. Arabic-language materials are used in the largely non-Arabic speaking south. Darfuri rebels and their supporters are boycotting the census. Fighting in Darfur and the contested region of Abiyei threatens the ability to perform it. The government of south Sudan already declared that it will not be bound the results. Some observers fear that an imperfect census will further marginalize Darfuris and grant non-Sudanese new arrivals voting and property rights. In spite of all those legitimate concerns, the U.N. Secretary-General and the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sudan welcome the long-awaited census.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1769

On July 31, 2007, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1769. The resolution authorized a joint United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. UNAMID will be the largest United Nations peacekeeping force ever deployed, with more than 26,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel. UNAMID is authorized to support early and effective implementation of the practically defunct 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement and prevent disruption of its implementation. The force is also authorized to prevent armed attacks and protect civilians. UNAMID is also mandated to protect its own facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure security and freedom of movement of its personnel and of humanitarian workers. As of March 10, only 9,178 uniformed personnel — roughly 35 percent of the total authorized force — were deployed. The group includes 7,441 military personnel, 1,597 police officers and one police unit. Only 1,312 civilians — less than 25 percent of the authorized civilian component of the force — were deployed as of that date. Another 3,600 troops from Egypt and Ethiopia are slated for deployment in May. If the U.N. fails to fully deploy UNAMID, it will be only the second time in history that its troops did not deploy after authorization by the Security Council. The first time was Resolution 1706, which authorized troops for Darfur UNAMID is estimated to cost $2.5 billion a year, in addition to start-up costs. U.N. member states will fund the mission through the U.N. assessment scale. The United States will contribute 27.1 percent of costs. Of the approximately 9,000 troops deployed, roughly 7,400 were transferred to UNAMID from the now-defunct African Union Mission in Sudan. The transition has not been smooth:

[t]he force is…facing challenges in its transition from the AMIS to the UNAMID logistics supply system. Similarly, the mission is further hampered by ageing equipment inherited from AMIS. Until the process of AMIS asset liquidation is complete, communication equipment and vehicles transferred from AMIS cannot be processed for United Nations registration, licensing and maintenance. As a result, many of the computers, radios and vehicles used by former AMIS military and police personnel are incompatible with United Nations networks and standards.

As detailed in the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council on February 14, seven months after Resolution 1769 passed, Khartoum continues to obstruct deployment of UNAMID. The Sudanese government has not provided adequate land for bases. It explicitly refused units from Norway, Sweden and others that the U.N. deems critical to the success of the mission. The Sudanese government routinely delayed the release of equipment from Port Sudan, and it obstructed visas for contractors. Additionally, the government has not approved the list of troop contributing countries submitted by the U.N. on October 2, 2007. Such tactics are part of a long-standing and well-documented pattern to frustrate and inhibit the progress of UNAMID deployment. In his latest briefing to the U.N. Security Council on April 22, UNAMID chief Rodolphe Adada said that the obstacles faced by the
understaffed and underequipped mission “have not reduced over the last three months, and that personnel continue to serve “under exceptionally difficult conditions, facing daily dangers and hardships. Equally problematic is the reticence of U.N. member states to contribute the heavy equipment and airborne assets necessary for UNAMID. Member states, especially those with an expansive arsenal of equipment — NATO-members, Russia, China, and others — claim that they are militarily overstretched or that they already contributed more than their fair share. Even a cursory look at the number of uncommitted airborne assets of the United States, European Union states, Russia, the Ukraine and others reveals that the shortage is one of political will. The United States, Britain, and France are urging other nations to contribute the assets, instead of doing it themselves. UNAMID needs three Medium Utility Helicopter Wings and one Light Tactical Helicopter Wing, totaling 18 transport and six tactical helicopters as well as associated operators and maintenance teams. The mission also needs heavy transport trucks. Considering the size of Darfur and the state of its infrastructure, it is a modest request. More than six months after authorization, the force only has a pledge for three to four tactical and up to two transport helicopters from Ethiopia. The U.N. reportedly turned down helicopter offers from Bangladesh and Jordan because they did not meet minimum standards for operating in Darfur. The helicopters did not have one or more of the required features: engine filters for sand, night-flight capabilities, or the minimum range necessary. Although Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. announced on March 4 that his country would supply helicopters to UNAMID manned by crews from other countries, no official offer was submitted to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operatio With every passing day, full UNAMID deployment becomes more urgent but also less likely. With merely a third of the total force deployed, only the most rudimentary equipment, only a few months left until UNAMID’s current authorization expires, and the impending rainy season from June-September, severely limiting mobility in an area that already suffers from some of the worst infrastructure in the world, time is rapidly running out. On March 5, U.S. special envoy to Sudan Richard Williamson said that a new group called Friends of UNAMID would meet at the U.N. that week to help arrange for training and equipment for peacekeepers in Darfur. The group includes representatives from the United States, Canada, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Tanzania, the European Union and the U.N. Department for Peacekeeping Operations.

New International Forces in Chad & the Central African Republic

On September 25 2007, the U.N. Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1778 establishing two new forces: the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the European Union-led EU Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR). It was the first time the Security Council authorized a U.N. force and a non-U.N. force with supplementary mandates. Half of EUFOR’s 3,700-strong force is composed of French troops and the remainder comes from 18 other countries. The force is authorized for an initial term of one year and is authorized to take all necessary measures to protect civilians, U.N. personnel and to ensure safe passage for humanitarian aid. An additional reserve of 600 troops will be stationed in Europe. Of the total force strength, only 1,770 have been deployed so far, with an expected 175 additional troops arriving in eastern Chad in the coming weeks. The force commander described the deployment, despite delays, as “going smoothly.”57 MINURCAT has an authorized strength of up to 350 police and military liaison officers and an equal number of civilian staff from a variety of U.N. member states. Its mandate is to train and otherwise support Chadian police tasked with protecting refugee camps in the eastern part of the country. Over 100 MINURCAT personnel are already deployed and more will join them as EUFOR begins to implement its mandate. EUFOR is tasked with creating the secure environment needed for MINURCAT to train and support Chadian police. On March 4, a EUFOR vehicle strayed a few kilometers across the unmarked Chad-Darfur border. Sudanese government sources claimed that soldiers shot at a checkpoint five kilometers past the border and fled when Sudanese forces fired back. EUFOR’s forces suffered its only casualty so far when a soldier was found dead just inside the Sudanese border. Two Sudanese citizens were also killed in the skirmish, but it is not clear if they were civilians.

New Government Offensives

In a recent interview with the Sudanese newspaper al-Sahafa, the Sudanese Defense Minister announced that he was not bound by any previously signed agreements and that “all areas where rebels are present will continue to be targets of the armed forces. Government forces launched a renewed offensive in February aimed at dislodging the JEM from its stronghold in the Jabal Moun area of West Darfur. According to local observers, preparations for the attack started months ago. On February 8, following an aerial assault by Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships, government forces attacked the towns of Sirba, Abu Surug and Silia, killing a large number of civilians. Witnesses in all three locations reported that Antonov transport planes that the Sudanese air force converted into bombers were painted white, a color reserved for humanitarian and medical aircrafts, in clear violation of international humanitarian law. Shortly thereafter, Janjaweed looted and burned down large parts of the towns. In all, over one hundred civilians, including children and the elderly, were killed. Hundreds more were injured and close to 40,000 people were displaced. Over 10,000 of the displaced fled to refugee camps in Chad. Many of Silia’s over 10,000 displaced persons sought refuge in the town and IDP camp of Aro Sharo nearby. The air force, government forces and Janjaweed attacked them there, along with the original inhabitants in both the camp and town. Many of the 5,000 original refugees who lived in the camp, as well as residents of the town itself, fled following the first wave of attacks on Silia and the two other towns. Still, as many as 15 people were killed in the February 18th attacks, according to the JEM. Since rebels took control of the Jabal Moun area in late 2007, the government has denied humanitarian access to areas north of Seraf Jidad, cutting off 160,000 people from aid. On March 3, Ameerah Haq, the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, said that JEM was denying an assessment mission access to Jabal Moun. The U.N. appealed to all parties to provide unfettered access to humanitarian workers. After nearly two weeks of relative stability and improved access, Sudanese government aircraft resumed air strikes in the Jebel Moun area. Roughly 20,000 additional civilians remain trapped in that area. Attacks on the North Darfur village of Shigeg Karo on May 4 illustrated the absence of a UNAMID rapid response capability. An Antonov bomber shelled the village, killing at least eleven civilians. Half of the casualties were children under eleven. The attack destroyed a school and one of only two water pumps in the village. Another 30 people were injured. It took over 48 hours for assistance and medical evacuation to arrive. In its current state, UNAMID can not protect civilians or its own assets. The force itself came under attack at least four times since its partial deployment on December 31, 2007. Force personnel did not return fire during any of those attacks. Once they were not even armed. The last time, four unidentified armed men hijacked two of three vehicles in a UNAMID convoy and stole personal belongings and identification cards. Each time UNAMID is attacked and does not return fire, it reinforces the perception that it cannot even protect itself, let alone the civilians in its care. Individuals not affiliated with the government, most likely common criminals, attacked UNAMID only after three government attacks without retaliation.

Chadian Rebels Push for N’Djamena

On February 2, about 4,000 Chadian rebels reached the Chadian capital N’Djamena as part of a swift offensive launched from Darfur. They entered Chad near Adé, south of al-Geneina in West Darfur. This was not the first time Chadian rebels supported by Khartoum tried to dislodge Chadian President Idriss Deby, an active supporter of Darfuri rebels. In April 2006, rebels nearly took the capital when French Mirage fighter jets helped Deby’s Republican Guard thwart them in an eleventh-hour effort. France said it would not get involved, but when Deby’s demise seemed all but certain, France offered to evacuate him. When Deby turned the offer down, France provided intelligence and logistical assets, though not direct military resources, under the cover of a Security Council resolution authorizing France to help repel the rebels. Similarly, the African Union said that they will not recognize an authority that comes to power by force in Chad. As these events were unfolding, Chadian Prime Minister Nouradin Koumkoye demanded that the international community find another home for Sudanese refugees in Chad. He even threatened that if “they cannot do it, we are going to do it. Analysts viewed these statements as a maneuver to hasten the deployment of international forces. Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-Mi made a more measured statement, saying that “the government does not want to deal with more refugees. Regardless, Chad does not have the resources to move a quarter million refugees, or anywhere to move them to. The Chadian government used two similar tactics to induce international pressure on Khartoum and elicit accelerated deployment of EUFOR. One was a short-lived refusal by unidentified gunmen presumed to be working for N’Djamena to allow refugees from Darfur to enter Chad. N’Djamena also delayed permission for UNHCR to load refugees onto trucks to refugee camps. The Small Arms Survey, a highly regarded graduate institute at the University of Geneva, noted in its most recent briefing paper on Chad and its relationship to Darfur, that Proxy forces supported by both N’Djamena and Khartoum are increasingly beyond the control of their masters, and pose serious risks to both. These militias are integrated into local ethnic and political conflicts, and limit the capacity of Chad, Sudan, or the international community to stabilize the region. It also concluded that Threats by the main Chadian rebel groups against the deployment of peacekeepers, together with confusion over the peacekeeping mandate and the roles and responsibilities of contributed troops, raise the likelihood of violence and insecurity, and places humanitarian operations in jeopardy.

International Criminal Court

On April 27, 2007, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Sudan’s Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, Ahmad Harun, and Janjaweed leader Ali Abd al-Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb. The two are accused of individual responsibility for 51 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, forcible transfer of population, rape, persecution, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity, among others. The Sudanese government refused to hand over either suspect. Sudan is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, the formal treaty that regulates the ICC. But it is obligated to surrender Harun and Kushayb because the case was referred to the court by the Security Council. Sudanese disdain for the court does not end there. The government announced during a visit to the country by the U.N. Secretary-General that Harun would co-chair a committee to adjudicate human rights violations in Darfur. Kushayb, who was in jail when the warrants were issued for unrelated charges, was released two weeks after Harun’s new appointment. To further signal its contempt of the ICC, Khartoum appointed notorious Janjaweed leader Musa Hillal as special advisor on tribal affairs to the president. Hillal is already subject to a U.N.-mandated travel ban, and is considered to have been among the most egregious offenders in North Darfur in 2003, 2004 and beyond. The Security Council can institute punitive measures in response to Sudanese intransigence over the ICC, but it has not done so, largely because of Chinese and Russian veto threats.

Working toward Multilateral Sanctions

On May 29, 2007, in response to Khartoum’s persistent intransigence and noncompliance with regard to Darfur, the U.S. announced unilateral sanctions against Sudan. The “Plan B” sanctions, as they are commonly referred to, target 31 companies owned, controlled or affiliated with the Sudanese government. They also sanction Ahmad Harun, Awad Ibn Auf, director of Sudan’s Military Intelligence Office and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Plan B was described by many economic and political observers alike as ineffectual. Time will tell if the sanctions help bring an end to the genocide in Darfur. Policy experts agree that multilateral sanctions would be more effective, but would require the cooperation of the European Union, as well as Sudan’s main economic partners, such as China, Malaysia, and India, who have so far been reluctant to sanction Khartoum. Many advocates and analysts have called for multilateral sanctions, but the political consensus is missing. Divestment The global movement to divest from Sudan continues to grow in the United States and internationally. Emulating the anti-apartheid divestment campaign of the 1980s, activists initiated divestment drives at the portfolio, university, city, provincial and national levels. In the U.S., 22 states adopted divestment policies and another 23 initiated similar action. Over 55 North American universities adopted Sudan divestment policies and there are 47 more active campaigns to do the same. Fifteen U.S. cities divested from Sudan. Australia, Canada, Ireland, Italy, South Africa, Germany and the United Kingdom are at various stages of divestment campaigns. On December 31, 2007, President George Bush signed the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act. The bill protects local bodies that divested from foreign companies whose business with Sudan fuels the genocide from litigation. It also prohibits federal contracts with foreign companies funding the genocide.

* * * The Darfur Update is published by the Save Darfur Coalition. It is updated periodically and is current as of the date in the header. The Darfur Update is available online at www.SaveDarfur.org. The Save Darfur Coalition – an alliance of more than 180 faith-based, advocacy and human rights organizations – raises public awareness about the ongoing genocide in Darfur and mobilizes a unified response to the atrocities that threaten the lives of people throughout the Darfur region. The coalition's member organizations represent 130 million people of all ages, races, religions and political affiliations united together to help the people of Darfur. 81 The most up-to-date information on the global movement to divest from the Sudan is available at www.sudandivestment.org. 82 “Implementing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act.” Genocide Intervention Network.

Source: http://darfur.3cdn.net/46c257b8e3959746d5_ttm6bnau2.pdf

Monday, July 21, 2008

The Baseline Issue by Sen. Antonio Trillanes IV

THE BASELINE ISSUE
A position paper

By:
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV


INTRODUCTION

Last August 2007, this author filed Senate Bill No. 1467 entitled “An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446.” or otherwise known as the “Archipelagic Baselines Law of the Philippines.” The bill was the result of a series of consultations primarily with former Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani, who first pushed for the Baselines bill way back in 1993. It basically defines the archipelagic baselines to include the Scarborough Shoal and designates the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as a “regime of islands.” To further facilitate the passing of the bill, the technical details provided by the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) as enumerated in House Bill No. 1202 filed by Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco as well as its other provisions were adopted in toto. Congress, however, filed HB 3216 that substituted for HB 1202.

Recently, controversies arose with the discovery of the particulars of the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) being conducted by RP, China and Vietnam within the waters off Palawan. Thereafter, Malacanang pressured Congress to revert HB 3216 back to the Committee on Foreign Relations ostensibly to push for certain amendments. These two seemingly unrelated events inevitably pushed the baselines issue at the top of the national policy agenda. Given this context, now is the best time for us to finally resolve this issue.

This paper intends to explain and justify the position adopted in SB 1467 and differentiate it with the other options, as well as to clarify other closely related subjects surrounding the baseline issue.

PD 1599, TREATY OF PARIS and UNCLOS

The first time the author studied the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) agreement was in 1994 as part of a course in International Law given to graduating cadets of the Philippine Military Academy who intend to join the Philippine Navy. The course focused on the UNCLOS provisions particularly: the archipelagic doctrine; the coastal state’s rights and duties within the territorial sea, contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ); the right of innocent passage; the doctrine of hot pursuit; and other provisions concerning enforcement of maritime laws.

After graduating, however, the new Navy officers were surprised to find out that the NAMRIA-supplied nautical charts used aboard Philippine Navy ships defined the territorial limits of the country as those stated in the Treaty of Paris plus the attached KIG borders defined by PD 1596, and not the UNCLOS definitions as taught to them at PMA. To be fair, NAMRIA has no other basis than the Treaty of Paris because our country, precisely, has yet to pass a new baselines law that would amend the pre-UNCLOS baseline law, the RA 5446, which is not compliant with the UNCLOS criteria. To complicate matters, the Navy uses PD 1599, a pre-UNCLOS unilateral declaration of our country’s EEZ, as a mandate to enforce maritime laws in these areas. As a consequence, the author remembers that when their ship patrolled as far east as the Anson Shoal in the Pacific, they used the Treaty of Paris as reference. And when they patrolled as far west as the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, they used PD 1599. In short, as of the moment, we have two sets of boundaries (PD 1599 and Treaty of Paris with PD 1596) and we will yet define another one (UNCLOS).

1. PD 1599, as mentioned above, is a unilateral declaration by the Philippines of its EEZ as measured from the baselines as defined by RA 5446. It was signed by then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos on 11 June 1978.

2. The Treaty of Paris is a peace treaty forged between the US and Spain in 10 December 1898. It detailed, among others, the territorial limits of the Philippine archipelago as being ceded by Spain to the US. These same limits were then used to define our national territory when we eventually gained indepedence from the US in 1946.

3. The UNCLOS, formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS III and also called the Law of the Sea Convention, refers to the international agreement that came out of the UN conferences from 1973 to 1982. The agreement consists of 320 articles and 9 annexes. To date, 155 countries have already ratified the UNCLOS and it officially came into force in 16 November 1994. The Philippines became the 11th country to ratify UNCLOS on 08 May 1984. It defines, among others, the limits of the territorial sea, contiguous zone and the EEZ of a coastal or archipelagic State.

Each of the above reference options has its own strengths and weaknesses, but if we are to consider both the validity in International Law and the area covered, the UNCLOS option is superior to the other two.

PD 1599, while almost as vast as the UNCLOS option in terms of area, has practically no binding effect in International Law by virtue of its being a unilateral declaration in the pre-UNCLOS era. Moreover, since we have ratified UNCLOS and, therefore, agreed to its provisions, we are obliged to rescind PD 1599.

The Treaty of Paris, meanwhile, may still have a binding effect in International Law, notwithstanding the UNCLOS ratification. However, its total area covered is significantly smaller because it cannot avail of the EEZ provisions of the UNCLOS.

As to the legal alternative of retaining the Treaty of Paris while availing of the UNCLOS option, we, as a self-respecting people living within a community of nations, should not have two sets of boundaries that we can use for our own convenience. It is simply not fair; it is simply not right. Therefore, it is in our country’s best interest to adopt solely the UNCLOS option.

THE BASELINE METHODS

Baselines are reference lines drawn by a coastal or archipelagic State using different methods as discussed below. They are used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea (12nm), contiguous zone (24 nm), EEZ (200nm) and continental shelf (up to 350nm). Also, the waters enclosed by the baselines are called archipelagic waters over which an archipelagic State exercises sovereignty.

According to the UNCLOS, there are three methods that can be employed in determining a State’s baselines, namely:

1. Normal Baseline, according to Art. 5, “is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”

2. Straight Baseline, according to Art. 7, can be employed if ever “the coastlines are indented and cut into or there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”

3. Archipelagic Baseline, according to Art. 47, is a method of “joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of an archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main island and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1:1 and 9:1.”

Of the three methods, the archipelagic baselines method is most applicable and advantageous to an archipelago such as ours. Otherwise, to use either the Normal or Straight baseline methods, which are primarily designed for coastal States, would effectively waive our status as an archipelagic State and lose much of the archipelagic waters as defined above.

THE BASELINE OPTIONS

NAMRIA has prepared the following baseline options to cater to the varying political persuasions of the policymakers:

1. OPTION 1: The main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines while KIG is classified as regime of islands. This is the option adopted by SB 1467.

2. OPTION 2: Only the main archipelago is enclosed by the baselines while KIG and Scarborough Shoal are classified as regime of islands. This is the official position of Malacanang through recent pronouncements and the DFA position paper written on 02 Aug 2005.

3. OPTION 3: The main archipelago and KIG are enclosed by the baselines while Scarborough Shoal is classified as regime of islands.

4. OPTION 4: The main archipelago, KIG and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the baselines. This is the option adopted by HB 3216.

To have a better view of the differences between the baseline options, the table below (which includes RA 5446) was lifted from the briefing documents prepared by NAMRIA.

RA 5446: There are a few weaknesses in RA 5446. One, it violates para 2 of Art. 47 of UNCLOS where it states: “The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles except that up to 3 percent of the total number of baselines enclosing the archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum of 125 nautical miles.” As we can see from the table, RA 5446 has one baseline that exceeds the 125nm limit for long baselines.

Another weakness of RA 5446 is: it does not optimize the area of the EEZ since it excluded both Scaborough Shoal and KIG from the baselines and both were not designated as regime of islands.

OPTION 1/ SB 1467: The main strength of this option is that it maximized the area by including Scarborough Shoal without violating the archipelagic baselines provisions by classifying KIG as regime of islands. It is, therefore, UNCLOS compliant.

However, there are some misconceptions regarding the label “regime of islands” that it supposedly weakens our claim or reduces our sovereignty over the areas labeled as such. On the contrary, “regime of islands” is defined in Art. 121 as: 1) island/s that is naturally formed, surrounded by water and is above water at high tide; and 2) it shall have its own 12nm territorial sea, 24nm contiguous zone, 200nm EEZ and continental shelf. In other words, islands classified as regime of islands are treated the exact same way as other land territory. The only possible reason that coastal States would be forced to classify their territory as a regime of islands is because such territory is impossible to enclose within the baselines without violating other UNCLOS provisions. The Falkland island group is one example. Since the UK is at the other end of the Atlantic which made it impossible to include Falkland in its own baseline, it has no choice but to classify Falkland as a regime of islands. The US (if ever it ratifies UNCLOS) would probably classify Hawaii as a regime of islands by virtue of its distance from the mainland.

The Scarborough Shoal was included in the baselines primarily because its distance from Luzon is less than the 125nm limit. With this, our country stands to gain approximately 14,500sq nm of EEZ and continental shelf. Another reason for its inclusion is that Scarborough Shoal is basically a rock and according to para 3 of Art. 121, the regime of islands definition has an exception and that is: “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” Therefore, while it is advantageous for us to designate KIG as a regime of islands, we would be depriving ourselves of the EEZ and continental shelf of Scarborough Shoal if it would be designated as a regime of islands.

Of course, China is expected to protest the inclusion of Scarborough Shoal within our baselines. Probably, it may even be the reason why Malacanang pressured Congress to freeze legislative action on HB 3216. But if we truly believe that our claim over Scarborough Shoal is legitimate then we have every right to enclose it within our baselines. This does not mean, though, that we are provoking China into a war because, according to Art. 279, State Parties to the UNCLOS are obliged to settle any dispute by peaceful means.

OPTION 2/MALACANANG OPTION: The main weakness of this option is, while it is UNCLOS compliant, it failed to protect the interest of our country by not including Scarborough Shoal in the baselines when there is no hindrance to do so. True, this option designates Scarborough as a regime of islands but, as discussed above, a rock formation is not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf when labeled as such. Even if it will still have its own territorial sea and contiguous zone, these would have no effect in terms of additional area since the EEZ measured from west coast of Luzon will extend over these zones.

OPTION 3: There are several weaknesses with this option. Aside from those mentioned in Option 2 with the designation of Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands, this option is also not UNCLOS compliant for including KIG in the baselines. This will be discussed extensively below since Option 4 also included KIG in the baselines.

OPTION 4/HB 3216: At first glance, this may seem to be the best option. However, it violated para 4 of Art. 47 which states: “Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless a lighthouse or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest island.” Based on the table above and HB 3216 itself, Sabina Shoal and Iroquois Reef are low-tide elevations. A low-tide elevation, according to Art. 13, “is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low-tide but submerged at high tide.” Hence, we still need to construct a lighthouse each on these areas so that they can qualify as basepoints. Even this measure, however, is no longer possible because of the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” which was signed by the ASEAN members and China in 2002. In the declaration, we agreed “to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.” Both Sabina Shoal and Iroquois Reef are presently uninhabited but are being claimed by RP, China and Vietnam.

Another major defect of Option 4/HB3216 is, as we can see from the table, seven of the designated basepoints are islands presently occupied by other countries. According to the Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Isands, these are: Kalantiaw Cay (Vietnam); Paredes Reef (Vietnam); Kagitingan Reef (China); Mariveles Reef (Malaysia); Pugad Is. (Vietnam); Kanluran Reef (Vietnam) and Investigator Reef (being claimed by China). To insist on using these islands/reefs as basepoints is in contravention of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and may cause outrage among affected States. Designating basepoints on uninhabited, though contested areas such as Scarborough Shoal can be defended legally and politically. But to place basepoints on foreign-occupied territory, no matter how strong our claim, is an act of aggression.

If the proponents of Option 4/HB 3216 have not yet realized this, then the information provided by this paper, hopefully, will make them reconsider.

In view of the discussions above, the best option to adopt is Option 1 as stated in SB 1467.


The SPRATLY ISSUE

As explained above, the passing of SB 1467 will not weaken our claim over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or what is internationally known as the Spratlys. Still, the fact remains that, we are only one of many claimants in that group of islands. Of these, only Brunei has not physically occupied its claimed territory. According to the Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Islands (it admits the reports are varying), Vietnam has occupied 25 islands; China, 13; RP, 8; Malaysia, 5; and Taiwan, 1.

With this situation, it is impossible to expect a scenario where all these countries will just suddenly pack up and go home. On the contrary, we should even expect some of these claimants to assert their presence more in the coming years to explore potential oil deposits amidst the increasing demand and diminishing oil reserves elsewhere. In such a scenario, skirmishes are not unlikely as our Navy ships and fishing boats are regularly navigating these waters. In the meantime, nobody gets to benefit from whatever rich natural resources the area has to offer.

There are several avenues enumerated in the UNCLOS as regards conflict settlement, foremost of which is the mutual agreement of all claimant States. But after factoring in the unpleasant experiences (including our own) of countries conducting joint development agreements with China (Wain 2008), it may be best to strengthen ties within the ASEAN first. This way, our collective position would be at parity with China in any future agreement. This is the only peaceful way to resolve this issue.

The JMSU ISSUE

The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) was initially entered into by RP and China on 01 Sept 2004. Vietnam initially voiced concern as it was a violation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Wain 2008). But at some point, Vietnam was won over when it was included in the project. Because of this, it is now officially called a Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in The Agreement Area in the South China Sea.

The JMSU agreement is highly flawed for the following reasons:

1. It smacks of bad faith on our part as it was forged without consulting with the other members of the ASEAN while there was an existing status quo agreement among them. (Wain 2008).

2. It excluded other claimant States like Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan.

3. It was grossly disadvantageous on our part because it included areas that were not disputed.

4. Because some subject areas are solely ours, it violated certain provisions of Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution relating to the exclusive use of our own marine wealth or, if it is a joint exploration, the President’s obligation to submit such agreement to Congress within 30 days.

5. We are not at parity with China in terms of the actual conduct of the exploration since we are relegated to mere observers aboard their research vessels. Hence, there can be no guarantees about the integrity of the research results.

The CONTINENTAL SHELF

According to para 1 of Art. 76 of the UNCLOS, “the continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200nm from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”

According to para 6 to 8 of Art. 76, a coastal State is allowed to claim the outer limits of a continental shelf beyond the 200nm but not exceeding 350nm from the baselines as long as the information on the said limits are submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The CLCS would then make the recommendations to the coastal State regarding the outer limits and the adoption of which would make it final and binding.

Art. 4 of Annex II, on the other hand, states: “Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with Art. 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200nm, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.”

Since the UNCLOS officially entered into force 16 November 1994, supposedly, the ten-year deadline would have expired on 15 November 2004. However, because of the difficulties encountered by developing countries in coming up with technical requirements of Art. 4 of Annex II, a decision was made during the May 2001 Meeting of State Parties to UNCLOS to extend the deadline to 12 May 2009. (Sands 2005: 5).

With this, our country has a little over a year to submit the particulars of our continental shelf beyond the 200nm to the CLCS. Thus, it is imperative that all pertinent institutions of government provide and extend all the necessary support to NAMRIA to make sure that it accomplishes its mission on time.

To compound this deadline problem, we still do not have a new baselines law from which to measure the outer limits of our continental shelf. While there is no deadline in the submission of particulars for a State’s baselines, it is, however, the basis for measuring all maritime regimes including the extended continental shelf (VERA Files 2008). Therefore, we should pass the new baselines bill even way before the 12 May 2009 deadline to give NAMRIA ample time to adjust their data on our continental shelf, assuming that it would have the necessary data by then.

The SABAH CLAIM

The approval of SB 1467 is without prejudice to our existing claim on Sabah. Although the bill is not as explicit as Sec. 2 of RA 5446 where it mentioned that RP has dominion and sovereignty over Sabah, still Sec. 5 of SB 1467 states that the baselines law shall be without prejudice to other claims. To be sure, Article I of the 1987 Constitution has already covered our claim over Sabah and other similarly situated territories and no law can possibly override this Constitutional provision.

Having said that, the Sabah claim will always be a lingering issue for as long as we will not be brave enough to confront it. Sadly, all the administrations since 1986 refused or lacked the political will to resolve it.

As things stand, our country has a strong existing legitimate claim over Sabah, on behalf of the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu. On the other hand, Malaysia had been in actual possession and control over the island for more than a century now and, worse, the inhabitants of Sabah have expressed their desire to remain under Malaysian rule. Hence, it is very unlikely that Malaysia would give up its claim even with extreme pressure from the international community.

Maintaining status quo may be the preferred option of our past and present National leaders so as to avoid either being accused of selling-out our interests, or creating tension in diplomatic ties with Malaysia. However, maintaining status quo is favorable to Malaysia as they continue to possess, control and exploit Sabah. Moreover, as time passes by that the issue is not resolved, the farther removed are we from the actual circumstances on how Malaysia got to possess Sabah in the first place, which is essential to proving our claim. And, of course, the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu are continuously deprived of their inheritance.

War is definitely not an option not only because our armed forces are ill-equipped for such an endeavor but, more importantly, because we, as a people, have not reached and is nowhere near the level of nationalism and patriotism necessary for launching a politically, socially and economically costly undertaking such as a full-scale war with another country.

Pragmatically, therefore, the only option to resolve the Sabah issue is a compromise settlement between RP, Malaysia and the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu. The author concedes, however, that even this option would not be easily accomplished but then again, reasonable men will always reach a point of agreement.


RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Push for the passing of SB 1467 and its counterpart in Congress before May 2009 so that there will be a basis for measuring the outer limits of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. More importantly, so that our country can now officially claim the limits of our National Territory that is consistent with the international covenant of UNCLOS.

2. Push for the submission of particulars of the outer limits of the continental shelf to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf before the 12 May 2009 deadline by supporting NAMRIA and other concerned agencies in their data gathering.

3. On the assumption that recommendations 1 and 2 as stated above are achieved, we should do the following:

A. Modernize our fishing methods and technologies;

B. Invest heavily on marine scientific research and exploration of the EEZ and continental shelf;

C. Reach out to other claimant States of the contested territories in order to settle disputes and come up with an agreement for joint exploration and development so that all these States can finally benefit from the abundant natural resources in these areas.

D. Comply with the other UNCLOS obligations of an archipelagic State.

4. Modernize the Navy and Coast Guard. Logically, the next step after having firmly and clearly established our territory is to protect it. Aside from the basic demands of naval defense, we should increase our capability for maritime law enforcement operations.

5. Conduct a legislative inquiry on the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking.


CONCLUSION

As shown in the discussions above, the baseline issue is quite technical and highly complex because of the interplay with other equally important national security, economy and foreign policy issues. But after carefully analyzing these issues separately, this paper tried its best to come up with reasonable and feasible courses of action which, hopefully, would be given due consideration. Still, everything starts when we finally make a stand, as a Nation, by defining the limits of what is truly ours and what will be good for our country now and in the generations to come.




REFERENCES

2008 VERA Files (Tordesillas, Ellen et.al.). “Arroyo neglect, government infighting jeopardize RP’s territorial claim.” 24 March 2008. Downloaded from www.ellentordesillas.com.

2008 Wain, Barry. “Manila’s Bungle in The South China Sea.” Far Eastern Economic Review. January/February 2008.

2008 Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Islands. Downloaded from http://community.middlebury.edu.

2008 NAMRIA Nautical Chart No. 4723 (provisional copy). Philippines.

2007 Trillanes, Antonio IV F. Senate Bill No. 1467: An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446. Senate of the Philippines.

2007 Cuenco, Antonio V. House Bill No. 1202: An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446. Congress of the Philippines.

2007 Cuenco, Antonio V. et.al. House Bill No. 3216: An Act Defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446. Congress of the Philippines.

2005 Sands, Philippe. “Introductory Note on Issues Concerning Rights/Obligations and Deadlines Under Part XI of UNCLOS in Relation to the Extended Continental Shelf.” Written for the Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials. Ghana. 17-20 October 2005.

2005 Department of Foreign Affairs. Position Paper: “Determination of Baselines.” 02 Aug 2005.

2005 “Joint Statement on the Signing of a Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the The Agreement Area in the South China Sea.” Makati, Philippines. 14 March 2005. Downloaded from http://china-japan21.org.

2004 NAMRIA Nautical Chart No. 4200. Philippines.

2004 Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in Certain Areas in the South China Sea By and between China National Offshore Oil Company And Philippine National Oil Company. Beijing, China. 01 September 2004.

2002 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 04 November 2002.

1999 Zou, Keyuan. “Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine Relations?” International Boundaries Research Unit. Canada.

1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 10 December 1982.

1978 Presidential Decree No. 1596: Declaring Certain Area Part of the Philippine Territory and Providing for their Government and Administration. Philippines. 11 June 1978.

1978 Presidential Decree No. 1599: Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other Purposes. Philippines. 11 June 1978.

1968 Republic Act. No. 5446: An Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act. No. 3046, Entitled “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines.” Philippines. 18 September 1968.

1961 Republic Act No. 3046: An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines. Philippines. 17 June 1961.

1898 The Treaty of Paris. France. 10 December 1898.

* Other presentation documents, tables, charts and illustrations provided by NAMRIA.